Morality. It's a one way street.

[NonEntity]

...

[eye2i2hear]

"There you go again."

--Non2quote(OH MY GOD! is he quoting HER???) Ronnie's wife, "Just say NO."

[sorry dudes, I jest [strike]couldn't help myself[/strike] couldn't say no...]

[Marc Stevens]

I am hoping we can have Harold Thomas on again this month, we'll be talking a lot about morality.

[eye2i2hear]

I'm not sure if this fits in with your objective, but I found myself pondering it via a read of the Wikipedia entry "Voluntaryism"*, and thought I'd ask it here. Instead of the word 'moral' or 'immoral', why not go with the word 'logical' or 'illogical'?

== right liberty to remove post if and when further reflection reveal it to be yet another revelation of my ignorants, reserved ==

*a highly recommended read!

[NonEntity]

Thanks for the thought, Eye2, but I see them as completely different things. And the fact that there is a universality to "morality" as a human measure of actions and choices makes it important. Interestingly, as I was writing that sentence i reflected that there does NOT appear to be a universality to rationality. Hmm.

I'm not in the writing mode at this moment, but I will be coming back to this post and working on it some more at some point as it is something that appears to be central to my thinking of late.

For now, the sun is shining, I have a pot of chai at hand and a good book challenging my thoughts.

- NonE (I'll be bach!)

[eye2i2hear]

NonEntity Wrote:- NonE (I'll be bach!)

An excerpt from another exploring the topic (which includes sections on autistics and sociopaths):

Benjamin S Nelson, on TalkingPhilsophy.com Wrote:In some sense it is obvious that there are no moral facts. There are no moral particles floating out there in the world that we can detect by plugging in our moralometers. Presumably, if everybody on Earth died tomorrow, then there would be no good or evil left in the universe, while mountains and molecules would remain unchanged. The moral anti-realist wants to point out that moral attributions are dependent upon our mind in this crucial way.

The spirited anti-realist is coming from the right place: they are particularly antagonistic to the claims of naive theologians who would think of good and evil as features of the universe that correspond to God’s opinions. Since the naive theological picture of the world leads us to empty prostrations and vapid rhetorical games, I will not consider it further.

Thankfully not all moral realists are naive theologians. Some moral realists argue that we’ve set too high a standard for what counts as real. They point out that we can weaken the meaning of “mind-independence” to a point where we can talk about morality as real. They would argue that things can be independent of the mind in some useful sense without it being necessary for us to imagine a world without observers.

I think that’s right. I don’t think we would need to be committed to the view that the real world is independent of all observers. Sure, if everybody died tomorrow, colors would no longer exist, since colors are complex facts about the way that the world relates to us and vice-versa. That doesn’t mean colors aren’t real. It just means that they’re the kinds of facts that relate us to the other stuff going on out there. They are observer-dependent.

Colors are also dependent on the mind in the sense that they’re dependent on our evidence. There is no color without evidence of there being color. Colors, like morals, are observation-dependent: if we could not find any cases that inspired moral judgments, then there would be no such thing as morality. In that sense, both colors and morals are dependent upon the (individual and collective) mind.

Colors are independent of the mind only in the sense that colors don’t exist just because we decided they exist. If you have a working pair of eyes, a certain kind of neurophysiology, and a cooperative environment, then the experience of colors comes for free. Colors are independent of the will. The color concepts have nothing to do with our choices and commitments. (Well, the primary and secondary colors are independent of the will, at any rate. Paint store colors may be a different story.)

Perhaps a similar story could be given for morals. If it turned out that morality was independent of human explicit expectations and contracts, choices and commitments, then we could call ourselves objectivists about morality, just as we can call ourselves objectivists about colors. On the other hand, if Benson is right — if it’s a contingent fact that we care — then we are going to end up with different conclusions.

At this point, the critic might ask: “fine, but what would we have achieved in this case? It seems like bafflegab, poppycock, dross, and lunacy to pretend that some of our interests are objective.” It sounds like a category mistake, a non-starter. Maybe human interests just aren’t the sort of thing that admit of objectivity — they’re just a subjective kind of thing. And this concern is grounded by the fact that our analysis has become rather shifty. After all, it seems as though we’re at the stage where we’ve watered down the meaning of “independent of the mind” to the point where it borders on homeopathy. Why should we accept that “will-independence” is a respectable stand-in for mind-independence? Surely the mind is made up of more than just the will!

From the start, I have assumed that the thing that motivates the debate between realism and anti-realism is the sense that justice is inevitable. The idea is that the demands of morality will eventually be recognized for what they are (by people in similar circumstances), and then be applied prospectively. The gambit of the moral realist is that there are some stable features of the human conscience that can be expected to persevere, and eventually, to triumph — at least, so long as all other things are equal.

If this is the sense of “moral realism” that we are interested in, then it becomes clear that will-independence is entirely appropriate. If morality is riddled with human choices and commitments, then it could only be by accident that people would arrive at morally sound conclusions. Far from being inevitable, it would only be through luck or circumstance that people would come to treat each other in a decent way.

The next question is, “would it be absurd for us to talk about some of our interests as “independent of the will”? After all, aren’t all of our interests based on our choices and commitments?

Suppose we were able to show that some of our interests are objectively real in the same sense that colors are. If we can show this, then we will have shown that it is possible for us to convince ourselves that our moral interests are objectively real as well. If there are such things as objective human interests, then that would show that it isn’t absurd to think that morality might be objective, too.

Here’s an argument that is based on an analogy to colors (inspired by Peter Railton and John McDowell). We are directly acquainted with colors through the experience of sight. Still, colors are ultimately just physical events in the world. The experience of seeing a color is composed of the relation between the neurophysiology of an animal, the lighting conditions of the environment, and so on.

Some of our felt desires are more persistent than others. We learn the difference between wants and needs after we’ve been put through the grinder of hard won experience. So we learn that we need to ingest certain proteins in order to stay nourished; we learn that it is a dumb idea to drink milk on a hot day; etc.

Let’s call the stuff that we discover to be our needs later on in life our “objective needs”. Our objective needs are like colors, in that we think we have a special acquaintance with them. But our objective needs also supervene on natural, psychological, and social facts – and they would have to, or else we’d be led into making the kinds of decisions that put us early into the grave. Natural selection demands that at least some of our preferences are objective.

Vital human needs are objectively real. They are mind-independent, because they’re composed in large part by features of the world (and our reactions to the world) that we had no say in. There was no group vote on whether or not we need warmth, sustenance, air, stimulation, and satisfaction — we just do need these things. Some interesting people can trick themselves into thinking they are hungry, even when they are not; or that they are sated, when they are starving. But the fact of the matter about their thirst or hunger does not depend on how they have chosen to interpret their bodily signals.

So, some of our interests are objective. Are moral interests objective in a similar way, or do they depend on the choices and commitments made by the will?*

It’s not a question of whether or not morality originates from divine commands and moral particles, it’s a question of whether or not morality is contingent upon the stuff we do on purpose. Quite a lot depends on what kinds of morally salient mental resources we think are independent of the will. If our moral radar is powered by abilities that are independent of the will, then the prospects of moral realism will disappear entirely.

I have characterized the moral capacity as being made up of empathy, ego integrity, prudential learning, and rationality, and powered by instinctive sympathy and resentment.
...
I don’t quite know what to think. But I do think that, whatever the answer may be, it will be answered through empirical means.

[right]---Morality, whether you want it or not, by Benjamin S Nelson ⋅ August 25, 2010[/right]
(as typical, the comments might be worth the time taken to read)

[eye2i2hear]

The Moral Instinct
By Steven Pinker
Published: January 13, 2008

One aspect of this topic that Pinker raised again for me, is what I might label "The Norm" Fallacy.

Quote:People given diagnoses of “antisocial personality disorder” or “psychopathy” show signs of morality blindness from the time they are children. They bully younger children, torture animals, habitually lie and seem incapable of empathy or remorse, often despite normal family backgrounds. Some of these children grow up into the monsters who bilk elderly people out of their savings, rape a succession of women or shoot convenience-store clerks lying on the floor during a robbery.

Though [highlight=#E6FF99]psychopathy probably comes from a genetic predisposition[/highlight], a milder version can be caused by damage to frontal regions of the brain (including the areas that inhibit intact people from throwing the hypothetical fat man off the bridge). The neuroscientists Hanna and Antonio Damasio and their colleagues found that some children who sustain severe injuries to their frontal lobes can grow up into callous and irresponsible adults, despite normal intelligence. They lie, steal, ignore punishment, endanger their own children and can’t think through even the simplest moral dilemmas, like what two people should do if they disagreed on which TV channel to watch or whether a man ought to steal a drug to save his dying wife.

How close is a "predisposition" to a mere evolutionary (ie genetic) option? And a disproof of the Logic* of claiming validity to the likes of "the norm"? Who (has the Authority?) decides which predisposition is "the norm", that of the moralist or that of the "sociopath"? Are the very negative words sociopathic and pschopathic evidence of majority, rather than the norm, rule? Immoral? Illogical?
[I've read some estimates to be that sociopathy/psychopathy is as high as 10% of the general population]

Arguing for morality as the norm results in much conflict.
Arguing against Logic is inherently circular: to communicate/argue is inherently logical.
Logic is arguably [sic] the very stuff of conflict reduction/resolution!?! Logic is obviously the innate 'stuff' of living socially. [I'm not wishing to argue that all claims of logical deduction are irrefutable; rather that unlike with morality, there is at least no question about it's validity/value, innate or otherwise --unless I'm being illogical here...?]

Pinker also includes this remark:

Quote:The idea that the moral sense is an innate part of human nature is not far-fetched. A list of human universals collected by the anthropologist Donald E. Brown includes many moral concepts and emotions, including a distinction between right and wrong; empathy; fairness; admiration of generosity; rights and obligations; proscription of murder, rape and other forms of violence; redress of wrongs; sanctions for wrongs against the community; shame; and taboos.

But aren't the likes of rage, jealousy, screaming/shouting, stubbornness, vengeance, hatred, superstition, equally innate?

Thus it seems that Logic trumps 'normal' (even innate) evidenced by there possibly, if not the probably of there, being no 'normal' via both the majority and the psychopath brain. Thus while the psychopath (brain) might claim actions moral, logic invalidates such as being 'normal' aka logical. It seems logical [sic] as well to say that the use of logic trumps morality-think, morality-feel, and morality-norm when considering that the morality-norm comes likely as a product of evolution. While fascinating to explore, Evolution = Muther Nature/Mother Fu*ker, aka amoral. But She left Us an out via having granted the art of Logic; logic trumps evolutionary traits, with morality being but such a trait? [granted, We are She (indistinguishable 'from' nature), so actually She either shot her schizophrenic self in the foot or we're simply the highest ("truest"), Logical Order...?!?]

--eye2i

* Pinker has a section in his article titled "Reasoning and Rationalization", which reminds me of my oft touted LRR: Logic + Reason + Rationale. It arguably takes all three to maximize conflict reduction/resolution. Hence, I capitalized the word Logic

[Dionysus]

eye2i2hear:

I'm not sure I asked you this before. but do you think morality can be reduced to logic? Can it be exhaustively descibed by a set of axioms?

[NonEntity]

I know this is not exactly an answer to your question, coming at it sorta bass ackwards as it were, but it may be satisfying to you nonetheless. In this article I proceed to logically point out that pure voluntaryism (my definition of morality) equates to "the best of all possible worlds."

I think Eye2 probably disagrees and has an entirely different view on it.

- NonE

[Dionysus]

^^ Yeah, I actually remember that one. That's a good one.

[NonEntity]

Dionysus Wrote:^^ Yeah, I actually remember that one. That's a good one.

Thanks.

So... did it answer the question you asked?

- NonE

[Dionysus]

NonEntity Wrote:So... did it answer the question you asked?

- NonE

Short answer: No, with an if. Long answer: Yes, with a but. :wacky:

It gave me some additional insight, let's put it that way.

[eye2i2hear]

Dionysus Wrote:...do you think morality can be reduced to logic?

With the caveat that for me, Logic is logical+reason+rational, yeah. On second thought, nopers-- but only because you used the word morality. :eekeek: I'm finding morality to be a notion of about as much practical substance as Authority, Rights, and States (and toss in Property while we're nailin'em :eekeek: 2).

Where Logic ecompasses logical+reasoning+rationale, I argue for its adequacy for conflict resolution/reduction, for which notions called morality have been sought popularly presently and in the past.

Quote:Can it be exhaustively described by a set of axioms?

Would you be so kind to clarify this question further (connect "set of axioms" with "logic") for me?

NonEntity Wrote:In this article I proceed [highlight=#E6FF99]to logically point out[/highlight] that pure voluntaryism (my definition of morality) equates to "the best of all possible worlds."

What I find with the notion of morality is first and foremost, it's a too historically volatile and loaded word any more (akin, but to a way lesser degree, with anarchy). For most it too easily lends to The Authority leap (and Right makes Might makes right). Including that's it too closely connected with the notions of "good" versus "evil" and "right" versus "wrong". I presently find it more-- well, logical --to look at social interaction via values, and said values arrived by evaluation, and whether said evaluations are done Logically (logic, reasoning, and rationale). LRR.

Using logic here yet further, logic is universally undeniable. Even the insane live by it, to some extent (otherwise, they're classified as a vegetable) and so can only deny it via being insane.

"Morality" seems to always boil down -factually as actually- to the likes of a "gut hunch" (Pinker's "innate" research being offered as possible support of such). Yet for perhaps the pinnacle issue of the matter, all through different cultures and different time periods, killing/taking a life isn't "murder" in every case, that conversely Logic would say otherwise (e.g. "human sacrifice" per religious morality, war's "collateral damage" morality, etc) [the two trolley car presentments drawing opposite moral positions being one indicator of how "gut hunch"/"morality" proves less than a genuine solution-- the supposed very point being The Final Solution; and the proof coming via: logical consideration]

It just seems to me that the more I contemplate it for myself, and observe the process with real-life issues, arriving at the most commonly valued actions within society can be done using Logic (see NonE's comment above, where the question "Is it voluntary?" is an appeal to having one's position examined logically), and just as importantly, are easily recognizable by most as being logical/LRR. "Immorals" of the past that now aren't, as having been over-ridden, seem almost universally to have been deemed so via logical argument(s), no? And those that remain are as easily acceptable for their being LRR as being innately arrived at, no? [NonE, my only qualm with having voluntary as a definition (or synonym even) of morality, is simply that morality as a word is unnecessary (and as mentioned, explosively loaded) viz it's a map with no territory-- or if more palatable, appeal to LRR as the better map/"higher ground"]

I'm open to persuasion to the otherwise.
(but I'm betting it'll have to be a doozey of a LRR argument...)

An interesting consideration is whether in a future where morality is a non-issue (NonI?), whether logic as a label would merely replace the notion for which the label morality is used by most presently...

ps: I don't use quote marks so much as "scare" quotes; rather to indicate words -duh- quoted, per their too typical/popular usage with which I take some issue~because I don't find that usage valuable and/or logical :wacky:

[Dionysus]

eye2i2hear Wrote:

Dionysus Wrote:...do you think morality can be reduced to logic?

[strike]With the caveat that for me, Logic is logical+reason+rational, yeah[/strike]. On second thought, nopers-- but only because you used the word morality. :eekeek: I'm finding morality to be a notion of about as much practical substance as Authority, Rights, and States (and toss in Property while we're nailin'em :eekeek: 2).

Where Logic ecompasses logical+reasoning+rationale, I argue for its adequacy for conflict resolution/reduction, for which notions called morality have been sought popularly presently and in the past.

Quote:Can it be exhaustively described by a set of axioms?

Would you be so kind to clarify this question further (connect "set of axioms" with "logic") for me?

I think what I'm trying to get at, and I have a vague memory of discussing this with you before, is that if it were possible to, for example, write a "morality expert system" computer program in which you codify all the rules of morality, and someone could input a scenario into the program and get back what the moral thing to do would be, and it passes muster with human judges (a la a Turing test), a strong argument can be made that logic (on which a computer operates) and morality are essentially the same. Otherwise, I think it has to be conceded that morality transcends logic. Sorry for being so periphrastic.

[eye2i2hear]

Dionysus Wrote:I think what I'm trying to get at, and I have a vague memory of discussing this with you before, is that if it were possible to, for example, write a "morality expert system" computer program in which you codify all the rules of morality, and someone could input a scenario into the program and get back what the moral thing to do would be, and it passes muster with human judges (a la a Turing test), a strong argument can be made that logic (on which a computer operates) and morality are essentially the same.

I honestly don't a.) recall a past discourse, and b.) know enough about what computer logic entails to really say, but I'm inclined to believe that's why it's crucial to include (or emphasize) reasoning and rationale within the scope of the word logic? [I'm inclined to even hope for a new label all together]

Quote:Otherwise, I think it has to be conceded that morality transcends logic. Sorry for being so periphrastic.

Well, "transcend" is but more woo in the mix, imho. Tiz the very primordial stuff of Gods and Right(s) [and yet provokingly again for some, Property] (the re-opening of the proverbial barn door).

What do you make of the presentment that: what has been immoral in the past, but is no longer that, isn't so, not because of some transcendence, but rather, consistent and persistent logical argument? And in almost every, if not every, instance?
Granted, there's often some emotional appeal (border line woo?) along with the argument, but at core, it's about persistence in logic, reason, and rationale, no?
Morality, as far as what I find most to hold about such, carries a once and for all and for always unchangeable either-or requirement regarding specifics within it.

Transcendence aside, perhaps, I intend to contemplate further how closely logic (LRR) and what morality may be, are to being one and the same. Presently though, as it's popularly regarded, I still find a crucial distinction.

Indeed, is to argue LRRly (logically) but at core to un-bury/de-blind innate morality... (and is this innateness also known as empathetic ability)...?! ???

Taboo, anyone??