"Civil Resistance And The 3.5% Rule" [@blog]
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"Civil Resistance And The 3.5% Rule" [@blog]
02-04-2017, 09:12 AM (This post was last modified: 02-04-2017 09:34 AM by eye2i2hear.)
Post: #1
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Thinking Hard fwiw/fyc/mmv/etc/etc

Quote: Civil resistance and the 3.5% rule
Post author: morganism 02 February 2017

Interesting, haven't seen anything data-driven like this before...

Civil resistance and the 3.5% rule.

https://rationalinsurgent.com/2013/11/04...-3-5-rule/

Quote:no campaigns failed once they’d achieved the active and sustained participation of just 3.5% of the population—and lots of them succeeded with far less than that.

Quote:Then I analyzed the data, and the results blew me away. From 1900 to 2006, nonviolent campaigns worldwide were twice as likely to succeed¹ outright as violent insurgencies. And there’s more. This trend has been increasing over time—in the last fifty years civil resistance has become increasingly frequent and effective, whereas violent insurgencies have become increasingly rare and unsuccessful.

Data viz:
http://www.navcodata.org/

Interesting strategic viewpoint

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/20...ur-trends/

1. Size and diversity of participation.

2. Nonviolent discipline.

3. Flexible & innovative techniques. Switching between concentrated methods like demonstrations and dispersed methods like strikes and stay-aways.

4. Loyalty shifts. If erstwhile elite supporters begin to abandon the opponent, remain silent when they would typically defend him, and refuse to follow orders to repress dissidents, or drag their feet in carrying out day-to-day orders, the incumbent is losing his grip.

(observations from article above)

Quote:The average nonviolent campaign takes about 3 years to run its course (that’s more than three times shorter than the average violent campaign, by the way).

Quote:The average nonviolent campaign is about eleven times larger as a proportion of the overall population as the average violent campaign.

Nonviolent resistance campaigns are ten times more likely to usher in democratic institutions than violent ones.

original overview and links article:

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfre...techniques

and a training site that has some exercises in group cohesion and communication tech, from Guardian.

https://www.trainingforchange.org/tools

edit: The article that got me looking, how to strike in a gig economy, and international reach

http://www.transnational-strike.info/201...g-economy/
1. 38 page pdf: Why Civil
Resistance Works - The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict
, Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth

Is it voluntary? (because if it isn't, what inherently is it?)
And can it be voluntary, if there's indoctrination, intimidation, coercion, threats & initiation of violence?
[not to be confused with asking: can it be said to be "voluntary" even when such is present.?]
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08-26-2017, 10:48 AM (This post was last modified: 08-26-2017 11:23 AM by eye2i2hear.)
Post: #2
RE: "Civil Resistance And The 3.5% Rule" [@blog]
[Image: bokmal.gif]
Fine lines, i suppose, 'tween Nonviolent conflict and Violent conflict.? But another (come lately) corollary --with the nigh standard caveat: written by a Statetheist/Governmentalist --thus treat those parts like the corn's cob, aka read between the lines?...

New Yorker Magazine Wrote:<...>
Why did civil-rights protest work where recent activism [e.g. Occupy WallStreet] struggles? The question looms behind Zeynep Tufekci’s “Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest” (Yale). Tufekci is, by training, a sociologist, and her research centers on the place where protest and digital media meet. She was in Chiapas, Mexico, among the Zapatistas, in the nineties; in Tahrir Square for Egypt’s revolution; in lower Manhattan for Occupy Wall Street; and at Istanbul’s Gezi Park for protests of the Erdoğan government. She spent a heroic amount of time in these protests’ digital antechambers, too, attending a Tunisian meet-up of Arab bloggers and visiting the café offices of self-made social-media reporters. Yet she has a mixed review of their successes. “Modern networked movements can scale up quickly and take care of all sorts of logistical tasks without building any substantial organization cavity before the first protest or march,” she writes. “However, with this speed comes weakness.”
<...>
Tufekci describes weeks of careful planning behind the yearlong Montgomery bus boycott, in 1955. That spring, a black fifteen-year-old named Claudette Colvin refused to give up her seat on a bus and was arrested. Today, though, relatively few people have heard of Claudette Colvin. Why? Drawing on an account by Jo Ann Robinson, Tufekci tells of the Montgomery N.A.A.C.P.’s shrewd process of auditioning icons. “Each time after an arrest on the bus system, organizations in Montgomery discussed whether this was the case around which to launch a campaign,” she writes. “They decided to keep waiting until the right moment with the right person.” Eventually, they found their star: an upstanding, middle-aged movement stalwart who could withstand a barrage of media scrutiny. This was Rosa Parks.

On Thursday, December 1st, eight months after Colvin’s refusal to give up her seat, Parks was arrested. That night, Robinson, a professor at Alabama State College, typed a boycott announcement three times on a single sheet of paper and began running it through the school’s mimeograph machine, for distribution through a local network of black social organizations. The boycott, set to begin on Monday morning, was meant to last a single day. But so many joined that the organizers decided to extend it—which necessitated a three-hundred-and-twenty-five-vehicle carpool network to get busless protesters to work. Through such scrupulous engineering, the boycott continued for three hundred and eighty-one days. Parks became a focal point for national media coverage, while Colvin and four other women were made plaintiffs in Browder v. Gayle, the case that, rising to the Supreme Court, got bus segregation declared unconstitutional.

What is striking about the bus boycott is not so much its passion, which is easy to relate to, as its restraint, which—at this moment, especially—is not. No outraged Facebook posts spread the news when Colvin was arrested. Local organizers bided their time, slowly planning, structuring, and casting what amounted to a work of public theatre, and then built new structures as their plans changed. The protest was expressive in the most confected sense, a masterpiece of control and logistics. It was strategic, with the tactics following. And that made all the difference in the world.

Tufekci suggests that, among that era’s successes, deliberateness of this kind was a rule. She points out how, in preparation for the March on Washington, in 1963, a master plan extended even to the condiments on the sandwiches distributed to marchers. (They had no mayonnaise; organizers worried that the spread might spoil in the August heat.) And she focusses on the role of the activist leader Bayard Rustin, who was fixated on the audio equipment that would be used to amplify the day’s speeches. Rustin insisted on paying lavishly for an unusually high-quality setup. Making every word audible to all of the quarter-million marchers on the Mall, he was convinced, would elevate the event from mere protest to national drama. He was right.

Before the march, Martin Luther King, Jr., had delivered variations on his “I Have a Dream” speech twice in public. He had given a longer version to a group of two thousand people in North Carolina. And he had presented a second variation, earlier in the summer, before a vast crowd of a hundred thousand at a march in Detroit. The reason we remember only the Washington, D.C., version, Tufekci argues, has to do with the strategic vision and attentive detail work of people like Rustin. Framed by the Lincoln Memorial, amplified by a fancy sound system, delivered before a thousand-person press bay with good camera sight lines, King’s performance came across as something more than what it had been in Detroit—it was the announcement of a shift in national mood, the fulcrum of a movement’s story line and power. It became, in other words, the rarest of protest performances: the kind through which American history can change.

Tufekci’s conclusions about the civil-rights movement are unsettling because of what they imply. People such as Kauffman portray direct democracy as a scrappy, passionate enterprise: the underrepresented, the oppressed, and the dissatisfied get together and, strengthened by numbers, force change. Tufekci suggests that the movements that succeed are actually proto-institutional: highly organized; strategically flexible, due to sinewy management structures; and chummy with the sorts of people we now call élites. The Montgomery N.A.A.C.P. worked with Clifford Durr, a patrician lawyer whom Franklin Roosevelt had appointed to the F.C.C., and whose brother-in-law Hugo Black was a Supreme Court Justice when Browder v. Gayle was heard. The organizers of the March on Washington turned to Bobby Kennedy—the U.S. Attorney General and the brother of the sitting President—when Rustin’s prized sound system was sabotaged the day before the protest. Kennedy enlisted the Army Signal Corps to fix it. You can’t get much cozier with the Man than that. Far from speaking truth to power, successful protests seem to speak truth through power. (The principle holds for such successful post-sixties movements as act up, with its structure of caucuses and expert working groups. And it forces one to reassess the rise of well-funded “Astroturf” movements such as the Tea Party: successful grassroots lawns, it turns out, have a bit of plastic in them, too.) Democratizing technology may now give the voiceless a means to cry in the streets, but real results come to those with the same old privileges—time, money, infrastructure, an ability to call in favors—that shape mainline politics.
--Is There Any Point To Protesting? [colors mine -eye2i]

One update i'd offer: the underrepresented, the oppressed, and the dissatisfied get together and, strengthened by numbers, force influence change.?

And hopefully going without saying (but jic): to jail (rhymes with "hell") with mainline politics! ?
Shape minds... one individual at a time...! ?
(aka focusing on the "boycott" possibilities, especially in the shape of alternatives if/where possible, and spreading seeds!?)

[the original is on the longer side, but arguably worth the informative read imo]

Is it voluntary? (because if it isn't, what inherently is it?)
And can it be voluntary, if there's indoctrination, intimidation, coercion, threats & initiation of violence?
[not to be confused with asking: can it be said to be "voluntary" even when such is present.?]
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